Inside Iran's Domestic Politics

Nicholas Platt, President, Asia Society
Elahe Sharifpour-Hicks, Researcher, Human Rights Watch
Elaine Sciolino, Senior Writer, New York Times
Gary G. Sick, Executive Director, Gulf/2000; Acting Director, Middle East Institute, Columbia University

New York, 27 June 2000

Nick: We're here tonight to try and take a peek inside Iran. And get a feel for domestic politics of that country and it's not an easy subject. A lot of us have been watching with great interest the developments in Iran in the last two years. And there's been a confusing ebb and flow of events, trends of political agitation, of cultural moderation, of big democratic turnouts, vote in favor of reform followed by counter-moves by conservatives who seem to be trying to reverse this process. There's been a trend towards greater engagement with the rest of the world, ever since President Khatami called for the dialogue among civilizations. The year 2000 has been especially confusing. The last five months we've watched while a national election took place, the Majles election in February and then, we've seen some of the results of that election declared invalid. Then, there were run-off elections in May for 55 constituencies, with the most important one in Teheran among them. The results of Teheran election were themselves called into question and a sort of a limbo, electoral limbo occurred for a while. During that same period we saw a closing of 17 reformist newspapers which was widely viewed as a political attack by hard liners against the reformists. We've seen assassination attempts for leading writers and so on and so it goes. There was a conference in Berlin in which expatriate Iranian pro-reformists danced what was regarded as subversively erotic dance and people have been arrested and detained for having attended that conference. In April, the trial of 13 Jews accused of espionage got underway in Shiraz. The trial was attended by representatives of human rights groups worldwide, including Elahe´ Sharifpour-Hicks who is sitting right up here today and will tell you about it.

We just got back from Iran in mid-May along with 16 senior Asia Society trustees and the supporters of the Society, several of whom are here tonight. We visited the country between April 20 and May 7th. It was an important trip for the Society because it gave our leadership a deeper understanding of the reality shaping contemporary Iran, some of them contradictory realities, let me say. But we got our sense of what was happening through direct contact with the people, politics, economics, history and culture and religion of the country.

All of us were struck by the openness with which we're received at the street level, let's put it that way. Things were pretty opaque at the government level. But young people in particular, and strikingly to us, high school age girls took the initiative to engage us openly. Our impression from interactions with younger people was that the desire for change and for greater personal freedom remains palpable. We were told in no uncertain terms and felt and observed all around us that Persian culture remains a crucial part of the Iranian national identity. Pride in Persia's past achievements, and high levels of contemporary artistic activity are part of everyday life. And the theocratic government not only lives with the sensuous and the romantic aspects of the national heritage but also preserves and promotes them abroad and at home, without any sense of contradiction. But there are tensions, there are tensions that are obvious to us, as well, just ordinary folk out-doing, so to speak, the cultural rounds. While we were there, the trial in Shiraz opened. We were there when the run-offs occurred and the results of the run-off election had not yet been approved. We were there when the results came in. It was a politically tense time and people who were in position of authority were very guarded in dealing with us. But others, ordinary people were less so. People had concerns that the reform-minded Majles might not even be permitted to convene, and this was described and discussed quite freely in conversations. We heard of the disillusionment with the economy's performance.

We were told that President Khatami's popularity is high, but the people are frustrated that his power remains so limited. The people we spoke to gave us a strong impression of accepting and even desiring that the process of change be slow but they insisted that it occur.

Now, on my left are three people who will be able to tell you much much more about what this culmination of openness and tension may mean. I defer to the three of them to help us go deeper inside Iran's domestic politics. You all have their bios in front of you so let me just say a couple of things about each of our panelists.

Elaine is one of the foremost writers of the New York Times, period, but someone who's also distinguished herself over time with a long track record of writing about Iran the last 20 years. And we're delighted that you are here, Elaine.

Gary Sick is a great authority on politics and economics in that region. He's a colleague of mine, we served in the National Security Council staff together back in the 1970s. I didn't last long as he did; I went on to other work but we've known each other since that time. I respect his knowledge very much. I am big ..umm..I like Gulf/2000's website, I think it's very good.

And Elahe´, as I mentioned is a human rights professional. She's been working on these issues for a number of years. She's trained as a lawyer in Iran and in the United States, and of course, she just spent over a month in Iran finding facts and I'd like to hear what those are. So let's start with Elaine and get a broad view of some of the contradictory currents that are flowing in that country. Thank you.

Elaine: Thank you very much Nick. It's truly an honor to be here today, speaking in front of such a learned crowd, many of whom I recognize as experts in the Middle East for several decades. And also an honor to be sitting on this panel, some of the best analysts on Iran today are in my midst. Nick asked me to give an overview of politics in Iran today all in ten minutes. Well, entire books have been written about this subject so I think the only way to approach is just to share with you some of the general trends and impressions that I have gleaned from covering Iran on and off for the last 20 years. At a conference in Cyprus last summer that actually was organized by my dear friend Gary Sick, I asked the panel of Iranian scholars a straightforward question, "Would an Islamic Republic in the office of the powerful Supreme leader of Iran exist ten years from now?" The panelists and the audience bobbed and weaved. I was asking a question that was much too direct. I knew it myself but I wanted to get it on the table. I mean it was some thing we all really wanted to know the answer to. So no one answered. And so next to me, Gary, I don't think I have told you the story. Rasul Asghari, he's a very well known Iranian journalist, leaned over and whispered to our little cluster in Persian, "The bride has gone to pick flowers." Everyone sitting around laughed out loud because when an Iranian couple gets married, the person officiating at the wedding, usually the cleric asks the bride whether she agrees to marry the groom. And the brides stay silent but the wedding gets answered for her. And they answer the question with the words, "The bride has gone to pick flowers." They all say it in unison. The question is asked the second time, and the second time, guests give the same answer. Only after the question is asked the third time, does the bride respond affirmatively to a cheering crowd. So, Rasul's response to this question was a very Iranian one. Don't ask such a direct question, he was saying. This is an open-ended process and we don't even know the answer to it and even if we do know the answer, it's unwise to tell you. So, let it go, keep things in the shadows. This is the time for the bride to pick flowers.

Rasul was saying something important about the nature of the Islamic Republic today. Iran today is series of overlapping guerilla battlefields. It's an unending process of surprise attacks and surprise retreats, sometimes waged overtly, sometimes in the shadows. These battles are being waged in the press, in the parliament, the courts, the theological schools, the cinema, even government controlled television, and as you probably saw when you were in Iran, with women in their clothes in the streets. Even the term Islamic Republic is a contradiction. Think about it, republic means government by the people. But Islamic means to be governed by the doctrines of God. So, there is this constant tension and battle inherent in the nature of the system itself. So, how do these battles play out?

Well, let's take the realm of the press which is the subject that I am most familiar with. As Nick said the authorities have shut down nearly 20 publications in the last couple of months. But they haven't stopped people from doing something else, printing books. So, the articles by Akbar Ghazi for example who is the leading muck wrecker in Iran today have been collected and published in a book. So you can go into an Iranian bookstore and buy this book and 200,000 copies have already been sold. So it shows how the Iranian public is making up for the fact that there are no newspapers, or very few newspapers. The transcripts of the trial of Abdullah Nouri, who's the former Vice President and the former Minister of the Interior have been collected into a volume of books ( I think there are two volumes). And also, the trial of the former mayor of Teheran, Gholam Hossain Karbaschi. And just look what has happened in the last several days. Over a hundred and fifty law-makers wrote a letter urging an end to the closure of the publications, saying that they had tarnished Iran's reputation abroad. Okay, so part of this guerilla struggle, another newspaper closes, Bayan. Then, the Teheran Justice Ministry issues a statement saying and I have to quote this because it is so delicious, "If the country and the judiciary were to seek international approval, we would have to eradicate our religious government and establish a secular, liberal, political system." Now they meant this as the worst thing that could have happened. So then what happens, the publisher of Bayan, the newspaper that's been closed, refuses to appear before the special clerical court, saying it has no jurisdiction over him. But there are no calls for creation of this secular, liberal political system. And that would be going too far, so I say stay tuned.

Complicating this picture is that the Islamic Republic is a fluid place where there are rules but the rules keep changing, so, it's hard to keep things straight. You know, I've heard it said that the Iranians are these brilliant chess-players, always plotting their moves several steps ahead. To me, they're more like players in a jazz band. They change the rhythm and the tempo and pick up spontaneous cues from each other as they go along. I'd argue that the key to understanding this country is knowing how to improvise. It's the only way to get things done. And sometimes, even the way to survive. This in a country where even seeing is not believing. I have to share with you a story, a couple of years ago I did an interview with Mohammad Reza Khatami, the brother of the President. I was doing a profile on the President and I went to see his brother who was then Deputy Minister of Health. He's now the one who's won more votes in the parliamentary election. So, in the course of this lovely conversation, he issued just a few little suggestions on what the United States could do to improve relations between the two countries. So, I figured this guy is a doctor; he's not a politician. Well this is very interesting, would you mind if I write this in an article in my newspaper? And he said fine and so it was one of those things we called shelf, you know just 600 words things above the Bloomingdale's ads. Didn't make much news here but he called the next day furious that I had published this article and he said I didn't say those things and you know, how could you write this article. And I said, "Excuse me Sir, I have it all in my tape recorder." He said that even if I said those things, you shouldn't have written those things. And then, the next day, he denounced me in one of the papers, saying that I had distorted his views. So, it goes to show that as a journalist, you really can't win. This brings me to my next point which is despite the closures of the political spaces, I'd argue that the era of exclusionary politics that's dominated the Iranian life since the beginning of the revolution is over. I think the slogan "Iran for All Iranians" that was adopted by the reformists during the recent parliamentary elections earlier this year is the ultimate manifestation of that trend. It means that Iranians who don't believe in the system of the Supreme Leader, Iranians who were not necessarily religious, Iranians who left the country years before - all have a place, however limited, in their country. Granted, there's no road map for getting there, but the recognition of the need to get there had become part of everyday politics. In closing, I know that it's dangerous to make predictions in talking about Iran, even Iranians who live and breathe politics there everyday don't do this and that was what my journalist friend Rasul Asghari was trying to tell me last year. So, I can't say that Iran is destined to be an Islamic democracy and I can't forecast the demise of the Islamic Republic either. But I have learned that it is impossible to talk about a unified Iranian regime any longer. The struggle for the country's future is far too intense for that. There's no one unified leadership that makes and executes all decisions, rather power is dispersed among and within many competing power centers, with varying agendas and varying degrees of authority. Alliances are shifting and coalitions are building. Iran, as Nick said, has the first independent parliament, reformist parliament in its revolutionary history. This is exhilarating but it's also very very dangerous. I also don't believe that the Iranian revolution has run its course. It took scholars, some scholars of the French Revolution, two centuries to declare the French Revolution over. And I'd argue that many of the battles that are being fought in the Islamic Republic today are the unfinished battles begun in the early days of the revolution that were never resolved. For the moment at least there is energy to fight these battles but not to foment another revolution. I mean if you look at many of Iran's other most active reformers, they were revolutionaries, they were even seizers of the American Embassy, they fought in the war with Iraq. One revolution in a lifetime is enough, they say. Now's the time to pick flowers and to plant more. Thanks very much.

Nick: Okay, let me now call on Gary Sick. Give us a more detailed focus on some of the recent events that have occurred and while we're picking flowers, a lot of things are going on is what I am learning, anyway.

Gary Sick: Too many things are going on, in fact to talk about in the brief time that we have available to us here. I do think that Iran today probably has the most exciting politics in the Middle East. Some of the other countries in the Middle East, the most exciting that's happened in the last twenty years is the death of the leader and the replacement by appointed son which you know can be exciting but it's fairly brief and you have more excitement that that in Iran any given afternoon. And it's, as a result, it makes it more fascinating and also complicated. I was struck in terms of what Elaine was saying about the kinds of changes in the attitude going on. One of those quotations by a close advisor to President Khatami the other day and I think he probably was unhappy about being quoted later on. It didn't attract much attention here but what he said was, looking back at the revolution. He said, "You know, I am not sure that it was much of a renaissance but more of a riot." And simply the fact that anybody can say that today is remarkable and that he's still alive as far as I know. And I think in fact this reflects as people are trying to think about what to do with this 20 years of experience, what to do with the lessons they have learnt, how to build the kind of regime that they're looking for in the first place, in which many people, I think, feel was stolen from them, was not what they had in mind at the time of the revolution. All of those questions were put aside for more than 20 years. And now those questions are opening again, though it is now legitimate to begin to ask what was the revolution all about, what were we trying to accomplish and how do we get where we want to go, without, as Elaine mentioned, without having another revolution because people really are not willing to do that although it could get away from that at some point. And I think that's the real danger.

The issues have gotten in the last year or two really very serious. President Khatami, I think, after his election in 1997,which startled the world, and certainly startled the hard liners and the conservatives. He had an agenda and he had a program, a strategy and he's been pursuing that strategy in a very systematic, clear, cut way. Sort of step by step and I think the first step in that process was in effect to establish control over the presidency itself, and thereby, begin to use that as a base of operation to liberalize the society, to open it up in a social and political way into directions that it wasn't. His second step in that strategy was to promote an election to the municipal councils which came a little over a year later. And there again the reformers won a dramatic victory; this didn't attract much attention in this country but it actually is quite worth it because what it means now is at the grassroots levels in all of the provinces. There are in fact people who reflect the reformers' views and for the first time, potentially, at least, Iran which has always been driven from the top, always been ruled from the top, often from just one man, certainly from Teheran, suddenly there's the possibility, not yet realized, of a politics in which you would have information flowing from the provinces, from the lower levels of society up and that I think is what he had in mind, what he was trying to do. And at least the beginnings of it are in place. There are no real political parties yet in the sense of being able to mobilize mass constituencies, having platforms and the like but they are getting closer. This year, I think, with the election, which was the third step in his strategy, the election to the Majles was I think, they came closer to having actual political parties than ever before. And there you did have large factions with significant support throughout the country, putting out a platform and arguing that platform and arguing what the agenda was going to be and so forth. I think the conservatives who are not stupid, but sometimes behave as if they are really didn't understand this strategy. They didn't know what was going on or they didn't believe it. They believed quite a lot of basically what their counterpart conservatives in the US and the West say, that all of this talk about the reform does not mean a thing because basically all of the power is located in the hands of the few major institutions and you can talk reform all you like but in the final analysis that is what rules. And I think they thought that too. And there's still a lot of people in this country who believe that and use that as their starting point. I'd argue that the reformists set about systematically to infiltrate and gradually take over the system. First they took the presidency and had the whole presidential office under their control. Then they took the municipal council throughout the country which was no small feat and thirdly, now they have got the Majles with a majority of at least of 70 percent in the Majles on issues that they care about. In the meantime, they have because of various abuses in the Ministry of Intelligence, they have cleaned out the Ministry of Intelligence quite a lot. A lot of people have retired and changed jobs and new people have come in. That was a major step forward that was something you'd never have predicted that the Ministry of Intelligence would be one of the places that you could start this kind of operation. There have been, even in take the example of the revolutionary guards, for instance the leaders of the revolutionary guards are hard liners and they are not at all shy about expressing their views. On the other hand, we know for a fact that all of the troops they command voted for Khatami and the reformists. And it's not clear if push came to shove just where that would come out and I think the leaders themselves are not aware where it would come out. And finally, the fact is that not only do the reformers not want to have another revolution but neither do the conservatives and the hard liners. And what has happened is that, at the very top, at least, as Elaine said in her article on Sunday, with K1 and K2, Khatami and Khameini, they have in fact, decided to work together rather than working against each other and they want to avoid the breakdown of the civil society, they want to avoid another evolution into what could be a civil war and I think that is an encouraging fact.

The new Majles has its work cut out for it and it has several dilemmas. And since I don't have a lot of time to talk about the whole structure of the political system, let me simply focus on three dilemmas that I think are significant and that are going to have to be resolved and are in the process of being resolved that we don't know what the outcome is going to be. The first is the one that is familiar to a lot of people in developing countries and that is: where do you begin to change the system. Do you begin with political and social reform or do you work on the economy first? And China has picked one way of doing this and they say you got to have economic reform and have that in hand. Iran has deliberately chosen, at least the reformers have chosen to focus on the social side first. They say if you've got an open press, freedom of expression, people able to talk to each other, and prepared to cooperate with the president on issues like this, if there's more transparency in the system which is what they are after and the system has not been transparent for the last twenty years. It has been very murky and very obscure and they are trying to open it up. If you have more transparency, you are in a better position to be able to deal with the economic problems that you have which are enormous.

The second dilemma is: should you operate within the system or try to simply overthrow the system? And Elaine's point that this Islamic Republic is in effect a contradiction of terms is in fact a problem that they are working on. And one way to deal with this, and I have many friends who say forget it, you just throw away the Islamic and go with the Republic. They've decided not to do that and they have chosen to experiment with a program to take an Islamic society and make it more democratic and more Republican. Will they succeed at this? We don't know. And the hard liners are making this just as hard as they possibly can; they are shooting people, they are putting people in jail for no reason, they are abusing the rights and privileges that they have and that is a problem that is not easily dealt with.

And the third real dilemma is whether or not all of that power stays on one side. In other words, whether there are certain institutions in the country that are sacrosanct, that can't be touched, that can't be argued about, that can't be reformed. And the reformers are saying that everything is open to reform but they are prepared to go very slowly to do that, to avoid this kind of civil war. The scenario could be the worst. So, basically Iran really has a revolution like no other. It does not look like the French Revolution, it doesn't look like the Russian or the Chinese Revolution. There are similarities in many ways but this is quite different. And a revolution trying to find its way toward democratic or reformist norms within the structure of a revolutionary society is quite unusual. And we don't know. There is a famous story and I'll end with this Andre Malraux, the famous French writer, philosopher, who went to China at one point and had an interview with Zhou Enlai. And asked Zhou at some point when he was talking with the great revolutionary. He said that I can't resist asking you this question, he said," In your judgement, what is the impact of the French Revolution?" and Zhou thought about this for a while and he finally said, " Well, it's too early to tell...." And I think that is what we have to say about Iran. It's really too early to tell but it is indeed quite interesting and it's going in ways that nobody would have predicted certainly twenty years ago. I'll stop here.

Nick: Thank you Gary. We'll go further into some of the points that you made later on. Let me now give the floor to Elahi´ who can tell us a little about an issue of great interest to New Yorkers, great interest to Americans and that is this trial of the, the espionage trial of the Jews in Shiraz.

Elahe´: Well, I apologize for reading from my notes but after all, English is not my native language. I want to thank the Asia Society for organizing this event and for inviting me as a Human Rights Watch representative to participate. The Asia Society is playing an important role in promoting dialogue between the United States and Iran. Today, the human rights issues have not been a part of this discussion. I hope that my presence here this evening indicates that human rights issues not be overlooked in the future. The trial of thirteen Jews on espionage charges in Shiraz reveals several aspect of the political struggle taking place in today's Iran. In my remarks I will try to place the case in the context of the discussion about the legal reforms that are currently taking place inside Iran. And I will consider the challenges that the case presents in the international community and its relation with Islamic Republic.

Clearly, the high level of international concern about this case has raised its profile in Iran, creating political opportunity for some and delicate problems for others. If handled badly -domestically or internationally, then the repercussions could be very serious for the progress of the reform movement within Iran and for Iran's relations with the international community. What has the conduct of the investigation and the trial shown about the situation in Iran? Firstly, we have seen a judiciary striving to act independently. It is often said that there are several power centers in Iran. The judiciary is one of them. Judges can and do handle many cases as they see fit in accordance to their interpretation of the applicable law. However, the judiciary does not enjoy complete authority over all matters of judicial nature. This was not a show trial in that there have been no strict courtroom scene of the defendants confessing to their crime before the bench. Instead, the anti-reformist television monopoly broadcast an interview with the lead defendant, Dani Tefilin, in which he made a confession to a journalist in an almost casual manner. Other defendants have made similar statements away from the formal trial proceedings. The nature of these confessions were not credible to people inside Iran and they overshadow the efforts of the judicial official in Shiraz to hold a fair proceeding.

It is important to note that by the standards of proceedings before the Revolutionary Courts, this one has been relatively transparent. Judicial officials in Shiraz have made themselves available to the local and international media, to the representatives of diplomatic community and to the Jewish community. When I met with the judge, this was the first time that the representative of an international human rights organization was able to discuss our concerns with the revolutionary court judge. Most remarkable have been repeated statements to the media by the defense team, one of whom is himself a former revolutionary court judge. Defense lawyers have been able to criticize publicly the prosecution case, specially, the admissibility of the confession testimony and the lack of other evidence. Defendants in the revolutionary courts often have no legal representation at all and for the defense to be able to present their case so publicly is highly unusual. I think, this may partly be attributable to the desire of some responsible judicial officials to be seen to be conducting a fair proceeding in the eyes of the world. However, equally important as the factor of the international concern is the domestic pressure for reform of the legal system and the debate that is going on between the judiciary itself.

What we see in the debate about the legal reform is the playing out of the competing visions of the future of the Islamic Republic which lies in the heart of the inter-factional struggle within the clerical leadership. Conservatives favor autocratic reading of the constitution and believe that the small group of leading clerics have the right to interpret God's law and to impose it on the society regardless of the views of the people. Reformists give greater emphasis to the democratic popular sovereignty elements of the constitution. The constitution offers support to both positions. The Shiraz case has fueled a debate about the role of the prosecutor as an essential part of the legal process. For the conservatives, process is unnecessary because a properly trained Islamic judge will know the right thing to do. Reformists see safe cause within the system such as an independent prosecutor as a backup for possible human error by judges.

Other high profile cases like the trial of the Teheran Mayor Karbaschi and the trial of the impeached former Minister of the Interior Abdullah Nouri have raised fundamental questions about the functioning of the legal system. The Karbaschi trial exposed the widespread use of torture during the interrogation and the Nouri trial, among other things, questioned the legitimacy of the exceptional course practiced by special clergy courts that have been used to silence opposition newspapers and writers. Domestically, the Shiraz case has given further impetus to the questions that are being asked about the structural fairness of the legal system. When I spoke to the judge, I expressed concern about the manner in which the statements had been taken from the defendants without the presence of lawyers and after months of incriminatory detention. The judge seemed surprised that I should question statements that he had taken himself, carrying out his joint duty as both prosecutor and judge. The day before my meeting, the head of the judiciary had announced his intention to restore prosecutors to the judicial system as a step towards comprehensive reform. Talking to judicial officials in Shiraz, it was striking to me that they had little understanding of what constitutes a fair trial in international law. Their thirst for knowledge about these matters were also evident. In this, they are surest representative of the majority of the Iranian judiciary.

International human rights education is lacking from law school-training in Iran. Moreover, the concept of the constitution as a guarantor of individual rights and freedom is not widely shared by judiciary with an ideological vision of law as a tool for imposing the right path. The head of the judiciary who was appointed last year has spoken of inheriting a ruined institution, seventy years behind the times.

The Shiraz case should not be seen as a part of a concerted attack at Iran's Jewish community. Iran has the largest Jewish community in the Middle East, outside Israel. Jewish Iranians I spoke stressed the point that problems faced by Jews in Iran are largely the same as problems faced by other Iranians. They see themselves as a part of Iranian society and culture. Broadly speaking, there's no animosity towards the community which traces its history back thousand of years and longer than Iranians. Unless the Shiraz case is catastrophically mismanaged, domestically or internationally, it's unlikely to have much impact on the situation of Jewish community in the longer term. The origin of the decision to prosecute the thirteen Jews remains shrouded in mystery. Few details of the alleged espionage have been publicly released. However, there can be little doubt as some factions have seen an opportunity to exploit the case for political gain and to frustrate the reformist movement. In order to stay in power, some factions within the ruling circle have an interest in playing up the external threat facing the Islamic Republic. As foreign observers of this proceedings, we are faced by a dilemma. On one level, international consent only demonstrates to those who wish to believe it that there is an international presence directed at doing harm to the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, we are obliged to object the violation of human rights when they present themselves to us. In my view, it is important to place the trial of the Jews in Shiraz in the broader context of human rights violation taking place at the present time. The closure of 19 independent newspaper, the imprisonment of the students after last summer's demonstration, recent imprisonment of the prominent journalists and writers or the detention of leading reformists after the participation in an international conference in Berlin are all causes of concern. We must avoid giving any one of these cases too much weight in determining future policy towards Iran. Turning to Shiraz case into three different broad diplomatic and economic punitive measures will only encourage political forces with confrontation. The way out of the dilemma presented by Shiraz case is for the law to be applied. As the spokesperson of the defense team has stated, according to the law the case against the defendants should be dismissed because the confession testimony was not properly obtained and no other evidence has been presented at the trial. He said that if the law is applied then the detainees would be released. However, he went on to say that if other factors were involved, then what might happen is beyond anyone's control. The reform movement in Iran in the judiciary, the parliament and the Executive branch is looking for appropriate support from the international community. It would be a tragic irony if they were to be denied that support because of the provocative actions and statements of the political opponents. We need to encourage the Iranian government to move forward with institutionalizing a more democratic republic governed by the rule of law. Thank you.

Nick: What I don't understand Elahi is who is driving, I mean, what is the dynamic in this case? How do we come to closure on it and how do the various political forces work on the judge and the judges?

Elahe´: Something that is very clear when I was introduced to judge S. Noorani and the past experience that judges are very independent, especially, the revolutionary court but who is running it, who are behind it is a mystery. And it's beyond me to even think who are behind it. But after the trial, and after the confessions run by the Iranian TV, we saw a couple of Iranian newspapers always highlight that these people are working for Mossad and in big titles, in big words in the front page. But before it wasn't there; after the confessions and later, Mr. Nasseri, the defense lawyer said that all this confession was made under duress by government agents. But again he didn't say what part of the government agent. So, it's remained a mystery and we have to, in future, I can tell you.

Nick: Here, I take your point that just not aimed at Jews, per se, but it certainly has anti-Israel overtones which are important. Well, we and this panel are allowed to ask each other questions and so we are going to take that advantage for a little while. And then, you're going to get your chance. So, I have a question for Gary and I hope that each of you will ask each other questions. When we were in Iran, we felt that there are very strong pressures for change on a very basic level from a younger generation that didn't have jobs. And then, sixty-five percent of the people who live in Iran are under the age of 25, sixty percent. And the economy is sort of bumping along but there's just lots and lots of unemployed younger people there for everyone to see. Now, the impression one gets from reading the material about various different political sides of the equation are the reformers are very much in favor of more freedom of expression and civil society and so on and so forth But they are opposed in that by the hard liners and the conservatives but there doesn't seem to be any fault lines or any consensus about what to do with the economy. To me that seems to be the biggest challenge that the Majles has to face. Do you have a sense of how people stack up in terms of their attitudes towards starting the economy?

Gary: Actually, they do know what to do about the economy; they just can't bring about to do it. And the economy has let's say three or four major problems. One is tremendous reliance on oil as a principal source of revenue. There's really not much they can do about it; that is going to remain true for some many years to come but they have created and inherited a series of issues that are immensely difficult. One is the Bonyaads, the foundation which in effect took over the economy at the time of the revolution. And are now basically out of control of the government and anybody else. They don't pay much, if any, taxes, they dominate the range of their activities, they hold something like $4-10 billion in assets and they represent somewhere between 10 and up to 50 percent of the entire economic activity of the country. And this is an old boy network in every possible way. All of the people who brought in the revolution have their alliances into these Bonyaads. They are making a nice living out of what these Bonyaads do; their children are employed there and so forth. The bonyaads, however, are not creating lots of new jobs. They are basically import-export type thing and they are not ----- so, privatization and change of the Bonyaads is one thing that absolutely needs to be done. And everybody knows it.

Another area that absolutely needs to be dealt with and of course, if you begin to deal with bonyaads, you get into deep trouble immediately with the whole entrenched structure. The power structure in Iran, and Iran's not the only country in the world that backs off from problems like that, it's a problem writ very large. Another area is foreign investment; they need foreign investment in order to expand their economy and to build it. And actually, this is one of the areas, where although they don't say so, I'd say, Khatami and Co. have done pretty well. They have changed the image of Iran from a hostile impossible state to a state that actually has a lot of good things going for it. All these exchanges, the artistic side, the fact that Iran is winning the film festivals everywhere, all of these things and this openness that existed or continues to exist but is under attack, has created a different environment. So, a lot of foreign companies are willing to come in now to Iran that weren't before. But it's a very slow process and that has not moved very far. In fact, they need the US to go along with it.

The final point is a really tough one - the subsidies. And basically, for years the state has underwritten the price of bread, the price of fuel, and so forth. And the prices of gasoline in Iran are amongst the very lowest in the world. They went up a little bit last year but it's still like 15-20 cents a gallon or something like that, which is unbelievably low and of course, the government makes up the difference. Internal travel within the country is so heavily subsidized that is literally, true story, of a guy who when he wanted to go from Teheran to let's say Shiraz, or to Banda-E-Abbas, instead of driving his Mercedes there, he loaded it in an airplane and flew it because it was cheaper to fly the car than to drive it. And these kinds of outrage are everywhere but again, as you know from lots of other countries, if you go tampering with the price of bread and all of these basic subsidies, people are accustomed to -- free energy, free heat for their houses and so forth and very low cost for telephone, all of those things, people go crazy and you have riots on your hands. So, they know what the problems are; it's just solving them is the problem.

Nick: Elaine, do you have something you'd like to add?

Elaine: On economy or on the Jews?

Nick: Both.

Elaine: Well, I will say a little bit about the both. I agree with Gary 100% but what I might add though is that, to reinforce your point, Nick, which is there's tremendous frustration among the young generation that can't see their way out. But what's fascinating about Iran is, I have never seen in the Middle East such a strong sense of nationalism. These kids don't want to leave the country because they hate their country, they want to leave because they want to wear shorts, they want to get out in the public, they want to have a beer, they want to go to movies, and hold the hands of their girlfriends, and they want jobs. And I would say, that if you ask any young Iranian what his or her ideal would be, it'd be to get landed immigrancy in Canada and be able to spend six months in each country which a lot of them have done. So, it's not self-hatred or hatred of the country; it's really "give us some opportunities."

I'd like to explore this the issue of the Jews a little more. And I'd like to ask Elahe´ because she's such an expert in this area. And maybe just share something I found in Iran over the years. I find that Iranians are very naturally suspicious, this is going to sound racist, but let me say anyway, suspicious of outsiders. This is a country that has been invaded over centuries. And it's also country that the Other is often defined even in terms of jokes. You know we don't like racist jokes; Iranians like racist jokes and it's really hard to get used to it. You know and they make jokes about Jews but then my husband is Jewish, so I get very angry when my close friends make about Jews. But they say we make jokes about Azeris, Turks, too, we make jokes about "Lashdis" and to try to convince them that the other is not somehow, that you do this, you can't define people in terms of making racist jokes or being suspicious. And I have always found that there's an inherent suspicion about outsiders, including Jews. And, I think, part of it stems from the feeling of the negative feeling towards Israel but you know, when you say Jews are treated like Iranians in Iran, are they really? They do have equality up to a point under the constitution but I'd love for you to elaborate a little bit more or maybe separate out the treatment at the trial which may be just as bad or good as anybody's treatment trial but what you see in terms of Jews and religious minorities and how they are treated.

Elahe´: About the jokes, I am from Esfahan and all the jokes about people from Esfahan being stingy and mean people. But going back to the question you raised, so many issues, I was raised in Esfahan. I think Esfahan has the most Jewish population out there. In my class, I had four Jewish and it's a mixed kind of school I used to go. I don't think Iranian people, they have any feelings about Jews in Iran and is just, they don't even look at this trial as Israeli spies coming and you know but you have to make the difference between Israel and the policy of Israel towards Iran and Iranian Jews. So, ordinary Iranian, again ordinary Iranian, they don't see anything against Israel. This is the government's statement after statement about Israel and foreign policy. But ordinary Iranian, they don't have anything against Israel but going back to laws. Yes, an Iranian penal code is civil code, discrimination against minority Jewish, Christians and the Zoroastrians and women is legalized. So many laws clearly are discriminatory against the minority. When I was in Teheran, I had an opportunity to talk with a board member of Jewish Association. And he said our problem is not this issue that international press are trying to raise; our problem really lies in Iranian Penal Code. We don't have equal opportunity for jobs, higher education, higher-ranking jobs, or these types of issues that they wanted us, and they wanted people from human rights organizations to raise. But again, those issues, Baha'is is different issue and ordinary Iranian, and even intellectuals, they have some concern about Baha'is, resented from Baha'is but Jews and Christians, they don't have. And government again, and factions within the government, is a different story.